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American psychiatry on the eve of Pearl Harbor was a small, stigmatised, and isolated spe-
cialty, for the most part confined as surely inside the high walls of its barrack-asylums as the
patients over whom it exercised near-autocratic powers. The number of mentally ill patients
incarcerated in state and county mental hospitals had grown sharply, from 150,000 at the
turn of the century to 445,000 in 1940. The fiscal crisis of the states that accompanied
the Great Depression had produced a steady deterioration of conditions in these institutions,
a deterioration that would intensify as a result of the exigencies of total war. In the immedi-
ate aftermath of that prolonged conflict, conditions had degenerated to such a parlous state
that a number of outside observers compared America’s asylums to Nazi death camps.
1
Yet the size of the psychiatric profession essentially doubled during the war years,
from 2,295 to almost 5,000. More importantly, the intellectual centre of gravity of the
profession shifted equally dramatically. Through the 1930s, the bulk of the profession
had embraced biologically reductionist accounts of mental illness. Correspondingly,
they had also engaged in an orgy of experimentation with somatic treatments for
mental disorder: surgical evisceration in pursuit of hypothesised septic causes of
mental illness; fever therapy, first for general paralysis of thei n s a n e( o rt e r t i a r y
syphilis) and later for other forms of psychosis; efforts to put patients into prolonged
comas, originally using barbiturates and subsequently using injections of insulin; con-
vulsive therapies using metrazol or electricity; and direct surgical assaults on the
frontal lobes of the brain.
2 Led by Brigadier-General William Menninger, who had
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401been recruited from the psychoanalytically oriented Menninger Clinic in Topeka,
Kansas, America’s military psychiatrists embraced a radically different, psychody-
namic approach to the problems of soldiers afflicted with what came to be called
‘combat exhaustion’ or ‘combat neurosis’. After the war, these psychoanalytically
inclined practitioners formed an aggressive new element in the profession, organising
themselves through the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP), and quickly
coming to dominate the American Psychiatric Association and the higher reaches of
the profession.
3
That domination was aided by the initial prominence of the Menninger Clinic in the
immediate post-war era in the training of a new generation of professionals, a process
aided by the flow of federal dollars for the first time to support psychiatric residency pro-
grammes. Such federal largesse was part of a much larger post-war movement towards a
more extensive role for the central government in training scientific and medical man-
power, and in supporting scientific and medical research. It was a shift signalled by Van-
nevar Bush’s memorandum to President Truman, Science: The Endless Frontier (1945),
4
and presaged the advent of Big Science and Big Medicine, as well as the growth of the
modern research university.
Psychology, too, had expanded greatly during the war years, as the mounting
numbers of psychiatric casualties in the military exceeded the capacity of existing pro-
grammes to train sufficient psychiatrists. In 1940, there had been essentially no clinical
psychologists. No formal training programme existed, and those few psychologists who
p r a c t i s e di na p p l i e ds e t t i n g sw e r ef i r m l ys u b o r d i n a t e dt om e d i c a lm e n ,l a r g e l yc o n f i n e d
to administering psychological instruments such as IQ tests and aptitude tests, and
m o s t l yw o m e no rJ e w i s ho rb o t h( a n dt h u sd o ubly marginalised at the time). Drafted
into clinical practice with combat troops, many psychologists acquired an interest
in continuing such activities in the post-war period. With more than 50,000 military
veterans confined in Veterans’ Administration hospitals, and a further half-a-million
discharged soldiers in receipt of pensions for psychiatric disabilities, not to mention
a mental hospital census now climbing past half-a-million, there was ample scope for
applied psychologists to move into the territory. With federal funding readily available,
first from the Veterans’ Administration, and from 1949, from the newly formed
National Institution of Mental Health (NIMH), the major issues that emerged were
the relationship of these clinical psychologists to psychiatry, and what sort of training
regime the new specialty would adopt.
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402Jurisdictional disputes of this sort are a recurrent feature of the sociology of the
professions.
6 From Menninger on down, the psychiatric profession in the 1940s and
1950s sought to keep psychologists subordinate to medical men. During the war, military
hierarchies had made this task simple to accomplish, and the bureaucratic organisation
and huge size of most state hospitals seemed to offer similar advantages in the civilian
sphere. But between 1945 and 1960, a sea change was occurring in the locus of psychia-
tric practice. Though mental hospital populations remained above half-a-million in 1960,
the census had begun to decline in 1955, and the bulk of the psychiatric profession,
especially the psychoanalytically oriented elements that now dominated academic
psychiatry and the more prestigious and lucrative segments of professional practice,
were engaged in out-patient practice. Clinical psychology was following suit, and in
these outpatient settings, bureaucratic hierarchies could no longer be used to enforce
disciplinary subordination.
American psychoanalysis was unique in insisting that its practice should be a med-
ical monopoly, even in the face of an explicit opinion to the contrary by Freud him-
self.
7 Attempts by David Rappaport to develop a training programme for
psychologists at the Menninger Clinic in 1946 had rapidly fallen foul of the insistence
of the Menninger brothers that psychiatrists as medical men must always be ‘the quar-
terback’ or unquestioned leader of mental health treatment teams.
8 But other psychol-
ogists quickly developed an alternative programme of professional socialisation.
Codified at a meeting in Boulder, Colorado in 1949, their approach called for two
years of basic training in psychological theory and research methods (including statis-
tics), followed by intensive clinical training before being granted a PhD. Importantly,
this approach linked the emerging applied psychology: to the newly created knowledge
factories that were research universities; cemented the willingness of academic psy-
chology to support their activities (for they brought massively expanded resources to
their enterprise via federal support); and gave them laboratory-based, quantitative
skills that were married to expertise in research design.
9 Competing with psychoana-
lysts who were intellectually and temperamentally disinclined to conduct large-scale
experimental clinical research, this approach allowed clinical psychology to acquire
the lion’s share of a rapidly expanding federal research pie – in broad terms about sixty
per cent of the federal dollars on offer, as opposed to the paltry five per cent captured
by psychoanalysts.
10
If psychiatry expanded its numbers rapidly in the post-war years, so too did clinical
psychology, an expansion that in both cases relied upon large injections of federal
funding. Beginning in the mid-1950s and accelerating rapidly in the following decade
and a half, programmes of deinstitutionalisation decimated mental hospital populations,
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403returning the overwhelming bulk of those once confined in the back wards (and latterly
those who would otherwise have been destined for such a fate) to ‘the community’ –
w h i c hm o s to f t e nm e a n tt og a o l sa n dp r i s o n s ,t op r i v a t e l yr u nb o a r da n dc a r eh o m e s ,
or to the gutter, as sidewalk psychotics became a familiar part of urban landscapes.
11
So the locus of practice for psychologists and psychiatrists alike became steadily
more and more skewed towards outpatient practice, a development further aided by
the partial extension of health care insurance coverage to encompass treatment for
mental disorders.
The psychopharmacological revolution had commenced in the mid-1950s, beginning
with the introduction of the first so-called anti-psychotic drug, Thorazine, the first of
many chemical ‘remedies’ for mental illness. For psychoanalysts, this challenge to
their therapeutic approach was initially met by ignoring the drugs altogether, or by
claiming that their primary purpose was to reduce florid symptomatology, thus
enabling the ‘real work’ of psychodynamic treatment to proceed (a stance aided by
the fact that the new drugs were no psychiatric penicillin, but on the contrary, at
best provided a measure of symptomatic relief). Clinical psychology in those same
years largely concentrated on developing short-term interventions that had statistical
validation in the laboratory, and these approaches, generally labelled cognitive-beha-
vioural therapy (CBT), formed an alternative basis around which their practice
revolved. It was to clinical psychology’s considerable advantage, in contrast to the
lengthy and uncertain course of psychoanalytic treatment, that CBT was relatively
brief and finite, lowering costs and thus greatly increasing the appeal of that approach
to insurance companies.
Psychoanalysis had managed initially to contain the potential threat posed by the
drugs revolution, but by the mid-1970s, that resolution was threatening to break
down. Antipsychotic drugs had proved to be an enormously lucrative market,
and questions were beginning to be raised in many quarters about precisely what
therapeutic advantages accrued from adding seemingly interminable and expensive
psychoanalytic treatments to the mix. A decade earlier, virtually every academic
department of psychiatry was led by a psychoanalyst or a psychoanalytic fellow-
traveller, but increasingly, the sums on offer to conduct laboratory research on poten-
tially therapeutic compounds were exercising a powerful appeal, one bolstered by the
critical importance of funded research in establishing pecking orders in large research
universities.
Psychoanalysts had long disdained the Kraepelinian diagnostic categories that had
emerged from within the world of the late nineteenth-century barracks-asylum. Theirs
was an intellectual approach that emphasised the complexities of the individual case,
and that scorned the notion that mental illnesses could be reliably and sensibly separated
out into distinct forms of pathology. Analysts’ persistence in this stance would prove to
be a fatal strategic error. The lack of reliability and consistency in the diagnostic process
had become an increasing embarrassment to the profession from the late 1960s, as it was
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404exposed in the courtroom by a newly aggressive mental health bar. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, it was an ever-more serious problem for the pharmaceutical industry. Drug com-
panies seeking new ways to profit from a burgeoning market for psychotropic substances
needed homogeneous groups of patients on which to test their wares and secure regula-
tory approval.
12 When a subset of psychiatrists who dissented from the psychoanalytic
orthodoxy captured control over the seemingly arcane process of devising a new nosol-
ogy of mental disorders, their psychoanalytic rivals scarcely seemed to care. By the time
they saw the error of their ways, it was too late.
Publication of the 1980 edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association proved to be a watershed moment in the evolution of
twentieth-century psychiatry. That document, and its subsequent, even more elephan-
tine revisions, marked the advent of the so-called neo-Kraepelinianr e v o l u t i o ni np s y -
chiatry. Embraced by the insurance industry and linked ever-more tightly to the
needs and requirements of the multinational pharmaceutical industry, for whom psy-
chotropic drugs were becoming the single most important and profitable set of products
they marketed, it marked the decisive recapture of the profession by a biologically
reductionist view of mental disorders. With stunning rapidity, psychoanalysis lost its
apparently secure grasp on the higher reaches of the psychiatric profession. Academic
departments rapidly embraced neuroscience and research on drugs. Psychoanalytic
institutes, never securely linked to research universities, found themselves starved of
recruits, and their brand of psychiatry fad e da w a yf a s t e rt h a nt h eC h e s h i r eC a t .B y
1990, a Presidential proclamation heralded ‘the decade of the brain’,
13 and the notion
that mental disorders were the epiphenomenal manifestation of disordered neurotrans-
mitters, faulty genes, or biochemical imbalances, was being heavily marketed to poli-
ticians and public alike.
The demand for psychotherapy continued to grow apace, particularly for milder
forms of mental turmoil and distress. But it was a market largely abandoned by medics,
as psychiatry tied its fortunes ever-more-tightly to the drugs revolution and systemati-
cally moved away from training neophytes in psychotherapy. Instead, it was clinical
psychologists and psychiatric social workers who occupied this market niche. More
heavily feminised professions, which lacked the market clout conferred by an MD
degree, theirs was a cheaper and briefer treatment modality. Chafing under these limits,
and conscious of how powerfully the biological accounts of mental illness have cap-
tured the public imagination, some elements within the ranks of clinical psychology
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405have sought to diminish the disadvantage they see their practices labouring under, by
attempting to break the medical monopoly over the prescription of drugs to treat emo-
tional, behavioural, and cognitive disorders. To date, they have had little real success,
for their rivals know full well the importance of sustaining existing barriers to this kind
of competition, and are determined to maintain the status quo.
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